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BLOXOM V. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, BEHIND THE VEIL: A
PROXIMATE CAUSE CASE
Garrett M. Condon ∗
May the president of a company be held personally liable for
the criminal conduct of an employee he chose to hire? In a sharply
divided court on re-hearing, the Louisiana Second Circuit in
Bloxom v. City of Shreveport 1 recently held yes.
I. BACKGROUND
Brian Horn, a convicted and registered sex-offender, murdered
twelve-year-old Justin Bloxom. 2 Horn, a taxi driver, had been
posing as a young female in text messages to the boy. 3 These texts
tricked Justin into sneaking out of his parents’ house late at night
and getting into Horn’s taxi, believing the young girl had sent a
cab to him so they could rendezvous. 4 Horn had successfully lured
Justin into the trap, from which there was no escape from Horn’s
brutality. Justin’s mother filed survival and wrongful death actions
against a number of defendants, including the president of the taxi
company David McFarlin—in his personal capacity—for hiring
Horn as a taxi driver. 5
Prior to these events, Horn had been convicted of felony sexual
assault in Missouri.6 After being released from prison, he moved to
Louisiana and applied for a job as a taxi driver. 7 McFarlin
∗ J. D., Hofstra University (2001), LL.M. Candidate, LSU Law Center
(2013).
1. Bloxom v. City of Shreveport, 47,155 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/31/12); 103 So.
3d 383.
2. Id. at 384.
3. Id. at 384-85.
4. Vickie Welborn, Man indicted in death of Justin Bloxom, SHREVEPORT
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20100413/
NEWS03/4130319/Man-indicted-death-Justin-Bloxom.
5. Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 385.
6. Id. at 384.
7. Id.
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interviewed Horn for the position, and chose to hire him while
having full knowledge of his prior conviction and registered sex
offender status. 8 While McFarlin made the hiring decision,
multiple layers of corporate and contractor entities separated
McFarlin from the driver employees. 9 McFarlin was the president
of Blue Phoenix Trading Company, which did business as Action
Taxi. Action Taxi used a subcontractor, Moore’s Consulting, to
employ the drivers. 10
McFarlin moved for summary judgment to dismiss him as a
defendant in his personal capacity. 11 In that motion, he admitted to
hiring Horn despite having knowledge of the conviction and
registered sex offender status, but argued that because he acted in
his capacity as president of Blue Phoenix Trading Company, the
company should hold the potential liability and not McFarlin
personally. 12 Ms. Bloxom argued that McFarlin owed a personal
duty to Justin and that his own fault caused the injury. 13 The trial
court granted McFarlin’s motion and Ms. Bloxom appealed. 14
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
On appeal with the Louisiana Second Circuit, a three-judge
panel originally decided the case in favor of McFarlin, with one
judge dissenting. 15 The majority held that McFarlin owed no
personal duty to Justin, stating “a corporate officer making a hiring
decision is primarily acting on behalf of his or her company [and]
owes a duty of reasonable care which does not extend to all torts
that all employees might commit.” 16 However, the Second Circuit
granted a re-hearing, and in a three-to-two decision vacated the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 385.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 383.
Id. at 388.
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original opinion and reversed the trial court’s summary judgment
decision. The majority on re-hearing said the facts of the case were
a “perfect storm” that created personal liability on the part of
McFarlin. 17 All the written opinions (majority and dissent in both
the original hearing and the re-hearing) are based on Second
Circuit jurisprudence, viewing the issue as one of “piercing the
corporate veil.” In that vein, the analyses in the opinions strongly
integrate corporate limited liability policies in determining whether
McFarlin should be exposed to personal liability or not.
III. COMMENTARY
Bloxom is a recent example of the Second Circuit’s line of
confusing cases involving personal liability on the part of
corporate officers, specifically in cases where officers personally
act within the scope of their employment. 18 These cases appear to
mix two different theories of personal liability for corporate
officers, labeling any instance of personal liability as an issue of
“piercing the corporate veil.”
A corporation is a legal person, an entity distinct from the
individuals who comprise it. 19 Generally, the owners and officers
of a limited liability company are not personally liable for the
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the corporation. 20 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 21 stated that
this protection is meant to encourage business growth because
individuals can invest in a company while insulating their personal
assets from liability. “Piercing the corporate veil” is an equitable
means by which a court can hold a shareholder or officer
personally liable for the liabilities of the company despite the
general protections of the corporate structure, generally when a
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 390.
See infra note 32.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24 (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:93, 12:1320 (2013).
590 So. 2d 1164, 1167-68 (La. 1991).
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corporation is in reality the alter ego of the owner or when the
entity is not truly operated as a corporation. 22 The opinions in
Bloxom recognize what the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated in
Riggins and elsewhere, all stating directly or in essence that
“Louisiana courts are reluctant to hold a shareholder, officer, or
director of a corporation personally liable for corporate
obligations, in the absence of fraud, malfeasance, or criminal
wrongdoing.” 23
A corporate bankruptcy scenario provides a good example of
this limited liability protection. Imagine a person has a business
idea. He incorporates, becomes the single shareholder, and hires
someone to be the president of the company to operate the
business. In an attempt to run the business legitimately, the owner
and president authorize several obligations on behalf of the
company, such as long-term contracts and loans. Unfortunately,
the business ultimately fails and its assets can only cover the
repayment of a small fraction of the total amount owed to its
creditors. Absent the existence of extraordinary circumstances as
outlined in Riggins, such as fraud or running a sham corporation,
the limited liability construct would protect both the shareholder
and the president from being personally liable for the remaining
debts of the failed corporation, despite the money still owed to the
business’ creditors. A court would only be authorized to pierce the
corporate veil (resulting in personal liability on the part of the
shareholder or officer) if the corporation was actually set up as a
sham to illegitimately try to protect the officers and shareholders.
22. Like in other jurisdictions, factors to consider when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil include “1) commingling of corporate and
shareholder funds; 2) failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and
transacting corporate affairs; 3) undercapitalization; 4) failure to provide
separate bank accounts and bookkeeping records; and 5) failure to hold regular
shareholder and director meetings.” Id. at 1168. The Second Circuit previously
applied these factors in Cahn Electric Appliance Co., Inc. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d
143 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983). The Cahn case involved a traditional “piercing the
corporate veil” issue of an attempt to reach the president and sole shareholder of
a company personally for the obligation of the company.
23. Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1168.
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The facts in the Bloxom case offer a wholly distinct form of
corporate officer personal liability, and really do not relate to the
notion of what commonly is referred to as piercing the corporate
veil. A corporate officer who takes a personal action, even if
undertaken as part of his or her duties to the corporation, is not
somehow shielded from personal liability because of the existence
of the corporation. The Louisiana statute on point specifically
excludes from the general corporate limited liability protection
situations where a third party has a legal right against an officer
who commits a negligent or wrongful act. 24 Further, this
distinction was made in Canter v. Koerhing Co., 25 where the
Louisiana Supreme Court explained that a corporate officer does
owe a duty of care under the general tort liability article 26 to third
persons when personally acting on behalf of the corporation. 27 This
distinction was actually emphasized in the law recitation within the
original Bloxom majority opinion, where it summarized the
holding in Canter by stating “[i]f an officer or agent of a
corporation through his fault injures another to whom he owes a
personal duty, whether or not the act culminating in the injury is
committed by or for the corporation, the officer or agent is liable
personally to the injured third person, and it does not matter that
liability might also attach to the corporation.” 28 Unfortunately, the
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(D) (2013).
25. 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2013).
27. See also Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982) (holding
certain corporate officials personally liable for injury caused by forklift when
those officials were delegated the duty to provide a safe working environment
and personally knew of the forklift defects but did nothing to correct them).
28. Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 386. The final phrase “it does not matter that
liability might also attach to the corporation” is in reference to the issue of
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Generally, a
corporation as an employer may be deemed vicariously liable for the actions of
its employees taken within the scope of their employment. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3921 (2013). For instance, the taxi company may be liable if one of its
taxi drivers negligently causes a car accident. However, the corporate officer
will not be personally liable for the torts of corporate employees based on his
general administrative responsibility in the corporation. See Canter, 283 So. 2d
at 721. This theory would be inapplicable in this case because it requires a
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original majority did not apply this law in their analysis, and,
puzzlingly, the majority on re-hearing failed to cite to it at all, even
though it is directly on point and tends to support their holding.
These same general principles exist in other jurisdictions.
While not part of Louisiana jurisprudence, the distinction between
piercing the corporate veil and personal liability for personal
actions was succinctly made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
Where the court pierces the corporate veil, the owner is
liable because the corporation is not a bona fide
independent entity; therefore, its acts are truly his. Under
the participation theory, the court imposes liability on the
individual as an actor rather than as an owner. Such
liability is not predicated on a finding that the corporation
is a sham and a mere alter ego of the individual corporate
officer. Instead, liability attaches where the record
establishes the individual’s participation in the tortious
activity. 29
“Participation theory” is not a term of art used in Louisiana, but
its essence exists both in legislation and case law. 30
The Bloxom case follows a stream of Second Circuit cases that
mix these two concepts. For years, the conflated analysis has
extended Louisiana’s corporate limited liability protections to the
personal acts of corporate officials taken in the scope of
employment, despite the distinction made in Canter. The analysis
in each opinion in this line of cases cites to Riggins v. Dixie
Shoring Co., Inc., 31 despite the fact that Riggins was not a case
involving a corporate officer’s personal action. The cases citing

showing that the employee was acting in the scope of his employment, which
Horn was clearly not. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1037 (La. 1991).
29. Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. 1983).
30. For an excellent and in-depth review on both topics, see Glenn G.
Morris, Personal Liability for Corporate Participants without Corporate VeilPiercing, 54 LA. L. REV. 207 (1993) (discussing Louisiana law on personal
liability for tortious conduct of corporate officers) and Glenn G. Morris,
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 271 (1991) (discussing
Louisiana law on piercing the corporate veil).
31. 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991).
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Riggins incorrectly use the lack of “fraud, malfeasance or criminal
wrongdoing” as a factor in not finding personal liability, as those
factors are only relevant in determining whether to hold an officer
or shareholder personally liable for the liabilities of the
corporation. They are not relevant in cases like Bloxom. Further,
Second Circuit opinions discuss policy justifications for treating
corporations as separate entities to rationalize why corporate
officers should be shielded from personal liability for their acts on
behalf of the corporation. 32 Again, that rationale is only applicable
for traditional piercing-the-corporate-veil situations and not in
situations like Bloxom. Even the majority opinion on re-hearing in
Bloxom strains to keep intact the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on
limited liability generally for the personal actions of a corporate
officer taken within the scope of their duties. With tortured
reasoning, the opinion tries to separate McFarlin’s actions as
somehow extraordinarily unique compared to the personal acts of
most corporate officers.
Based on Canter, the analysis of whether McFarlin owed a
personal duty in this case should have been relatively
straightforward. The issue is whether he was negligent in hiring
Horn. Negligent hiring cases are based purely on the standard
negligence provision of article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code,33
32. In Kemper v. Don Coleman, Jr., Builder, Inc., 746 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 2
Cir. 1999), plaintiffs sued the president of a construction corporation for failing
to warn that their newly built houses were susceptible to flooding. The president
personally knew of the flooding concern and did nothing to disclose the
information. The Court held that the president was protected from personal
liability because he was acting in his capacity as corporate president and that the
sales were between the plaintiffs and the corporation. In Carter v. State, 46 So.
3d 787 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010), a plaintiff sued the president of a corporation in
his personal capacity after a car accident caused injury. The allegations were
that he “conducted a negligent inspection of the tractor-trailer and determined
that the vehicle was roadworthy when it was not, made the negligent decision to
instruct his employee to drive the vehicle from the auction yard to his wrecker
yard at night and negligently entrusted the vehicle to an unqualified driver,” all
of which were done in the scope of his employment. The Court held the
president could not be held personally liable because these actions were taken in
his “corporate capacity” rather than his “individual capacity.”
33. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992) (on re-hearing).
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which is cited in the Bloxom original opinion and the re-hearing
dissent, but again, strangely, is not cited by the majority on rehearing. The duty-risk analysis used under article 2315 “requires
proof by the plaintiff of five separate elements: (1) the defendant
had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty
element); (2) the defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries
(the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard
conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of
liability or scope of protection element); and (5) the actual
damages (the damages element).” 34 Whether a duty exists is a
matter of law, in which courts must make a policy decision in light
of the unique facts and circumstances presented along with
reviewing laws (statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general
principles of fault). 35 Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence does
not factor the benefits of the corporate structure as part of the duty
analysis, but rather declared them distinctly separate issues in
Canter. Other Louisiana appellate courts have applied this
distinction. 36
While not used in their analyses, both the original majority
opinion 37 and the majority opinion on re-hearing 38 cite the same
line of negligent hiring cases. 39 These cases all state that a duty
exists (although limited in scope, like all negligence cases) on the
part of an employer to exercise reasonable care in the hiring of an
employee who, in the performance of his duties, will have a unique
34. Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 923 So. 2d 627 (La. 2006).
35. Id. at 633.
36. See Hemphill-Kunstler-Buhler, Auctioneers and Appraisers v. Davis
Wholesale Electronics Supply Co., Inc., 516 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987);
and Indest-Guidry, Ltd. v. Key Office Equipment, Inc., 997 So. 2d 796 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 2008).
37. Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 387.
38. Id. at 392.
39. Both opinions cite the same three cases: Cote v. City of Shreveport, 73
So. 3d 435 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011); Kelley v. Dyson, 10 So. 3d 283 (La. App. 5
Cir. 2009); and Taylor v. Shoney’s Inc., 726 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1999).
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opportunity to commit a tort against a third party. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has also certainly acknowledged a general cause of
action against an employer for negligent hiring, analyzed using the
standard negligence test of article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, such as in Roberts v. Benoit. 40 In Roberts, a sheriff
deputized a cook and gave general instructions to carry a firearm at
all times while off duty. Minimal training was given, but a manual
told the new deputy not to carry a firearm while drinking alcohol
and that the weapon should only be drawn if life is in danger. The
deputy later went to a social gathering where he drank alcohol and
engaged in horseplay with his firearm, during which he negligently
shot another person. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
despite the fact that the sheriff may have been negligent in
deputizing and arming the cook with insufficient training, the
scope of the duty did not extend to this particular harm because it
was too attenuated and too unforeseeable that the new deputy
would use the firearm in such a manner in clear violation of both
the manual and common sense.
The case of Jackson v. Ferrand 41 is remarkably similar to
Bloxom. The victim in Jackson had locked herself out of her hotel
room. A hotel worker assisted her by getting a master key and
letting her into her room. While doing so, he invited her to go on a
date with him and she agreed. While out, she alleged he drugged
and sexually assaulted her. The victim filed a cause of action
against the hotel for, among other things, the negligent hiring and
supervision of the alleged assailant, stating that the hotel knew the
assailant had a criminal history. The Court affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the hotel, finding that even if the hotel knew
of his criminal history, hiring him was neither the cause-in-fact nor

40. 605 So. 2d 1032, 1041 (La. 1992) (on re-hearing). See the entire Roberts
opinion for an in-depth discussion of the differences between the respondeat
superior and negligent hiring theories of employer liability.
41. 658 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994).
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the legal cause of the damages because the hotel could not foresee
the sexual assault despite his criminal history. 42
Because it incorporated elements of “piercing the corporate
veil” doctrine, the final Bloxom majority opinion failed to use the
correct analysis in determining that McFarlin owed a personal
duty. Limited liability should have been relegated to nothing more
than a footnote to state that McFarlin’s personal conduct put him
personally at risk based on Section 12:1320(D) of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes and Canter. The true issue of the case is whether
McFarlin is liable under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code
for negligently hiring Horn. The operative questions should have
been, first, whether McFarlin could reasonably have foreseen
Horn’s actions when he was hired such that McFarlin owed a duty
to Justin and his mother in this situation; and second, whether
McFarlin’s hiring of Horn was a proximate (or legal) cause of the
damages suffered by Justin and his mother.
While there may be many foreseeable risks in hiring a
convicted and registered sex offender as a taxi driver, it is a far
stretch to say that Horn’s murder of Justin was one of them.
Perhaps foreseeable would have been that Horn would recidivate
by either sexually assaulting a passenger he happened to pick up,
or noting a victim’s address in dropping them off and using that
information to come back later to commit a sexual crime. 43 But
using the taxi as part of a greater plan to murder someone? That
was not reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, even assuming a duty,
42. Id. at 702.
43. Close to this example is Smith v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 540 So.
2d 363 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989). There, the employer pest control service (Orkin)
was found liable for the rape of a customer committed by an Orkin employee,
because the company failed to enforce its yearly polygraph requirements. The
employee had unlocked a window while treating the victim’s home, and later
entered through that window and raped the victim. The Court found Orkin
should have foreseen this kind of harm (which they actually did foresee because
they had a policy in place for annual polygraphs of employees), and thus had a
duty to protect this type of victim. However, had the assailant simply used his
Orkin truck to kidnap and kill some random person he picked up off the street, it
is hard to imagine the Court reaching the same result.
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the link between the hiring of Horn and the murder of Justin is so
attenuated that it is doubtful a reasonable jury could find that
McFarlin proximately caused these damages. From the facts
available, it seems to be an unfortunate truth that Horn was going
to prey on Justin regardless of his taxi driver status. The taxi
happened to be of convenient assistance in his horrible plan, but
Horn easily could have substituted this with any other means
imaginable—his job as a taxi driver was not a proximate cause of
the damages here.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority decision on re-hearing, holding that McFarlin’s
duty extended to the harm Justin and his mother suffered, is of
dubious rationale as a matter of law. Of more widespread
relevance beyond this individual case, however, is that the Second
Circuit’s analysis follows a line of cases that incorrectly conflates
two distinct theories of personal liability and fails to follow the
Louisiana Supreme Court case of Canter. This jurisprudence
should be reviewed to align itself with Canter to state, generally,
that corporate officers should be protected from personal liability
for both the general obligations of the corporation as well as
vicariously for the actions of its employees, but should not be
protected when they commit personal torts in the scope of their
employment or personal torts committed in their “corporate
capacity.”

